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I. INTRODUCTION
Risk-based capital allocation methodologies and regulatory
capital requirements have assumed a central importance in
the management of banks and other financial firms since
the introduction of the Basle Committee’s Capital Accord
in 1988. However, as firms have progressively developed
more sophisticated techniques for measuring and manag-
ing risk, and as regulators  have begun to utilise the output
of internal models as a basis for setting capital require-
ments for market risk, it is becoming increasingly clear
that the risk as measured by these models is significantly
less than the amount of equity capital that the firms them-
selves choose to hold.1 
In this paper, we therefore consider how risk
measures, based on internal models of this type, might be
integrated into a firm’s own methodology for allocating
risk capital to its individual business units and for deter-
mining its optimal capital structure. We also consider the
implications of these developments for the future approach
to determining regulatory capital requirements.
II. WHY DO FINANCIAL FIRMS NEED 
INTERNAL RISK MEASUREMENT 
AND RISK-BASED CAPITAL 
ALLOCATION METHODOLOGIES?
The core challenge for the management of any firm that
depends on external equity financing is to maximise share-
holder value. To do this, the firm has to be able to show at
the margin that its return on investment exceeds its
marginal cost of capital. In the context of a nonfinancial
firm, this statement is broadly uncontentious. If the expected
return on an investment can be predicted, and its cost is
known, the only outstanding issue is the marginal cost of
capital, which can be derived from market prices for the
firm’s debt and equity.
In the case of banks and other financial firms,
however, this seemingly simple requirement raises signifi-
cant difficulties. In the first place, the nature of risk in
financial markets means that, without further information
about the firm’s risk profile and hedging strategies, even
the straightforward requirement to be able to quantify the
expected return on an investment poses problems. Second,
the funding activities of  financial firms do not provide
useful signals about the marginal cost of capital. This is
because, for the majority of large and well-capitalised
financial firms, the marginal cost of funds is indifferent to
day-to-day changes in the degree of leverage or risk in their
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balance sheets. This, in turn, leads to a third problem,
which is how to determine the amount of capital that the
firm should apply to any particular investment. For a non-
financial company, the amount of capital tied up in an
investment can be more or less equated to the cost of its
investment. However, in the case of a financial firm, where
risk positions often require no funding at all, this relation-
ship does not hold either. 
It therefore follows that a financial firm that wants
to maximise shareholder value cannot use the relatively
straightforward capital pricing tools that are available to
nonfinancial firms, and must seek an alternative shadow
pricing tool to determine whether an investment adds to or
detracts from shareholder value. This is the purpose that is
served by allocating risk capital to the business areas
within a financial firm. 
III. RISK MEASUREMENT, SHADOW PRICING, 
AND THE ROLE OF THE SHARPE RATIO
Since the objective of maximising shareholder value can be
achieved either by increasing the return for a given level
of risk, or alternatively by reducing the risk for a given
rate of return, the internal shadow pricing process needs
to be structured in a way that will assist management in
achieving this objective. In other words, the shadow pric-
ing tool has to have as its objective the maximisation of the
firmwide Sharpe Ratio, since the Sharpe Ratio is simply
the expression of return in relation to risk. Seen in these
terms, we can draw a number of important conclusions that
will assist us in determining how we should build our
shadow pricing process.
First, and importantly, the shadow pricing process
should operate in a manner that is independent of the level
of equity capital in the firm. This follows because, where
the perceived risk of bankruptcy is negligible, as is the case
for most large financial firms, the Sharpe Ratio is indepen-
dent of the amount of equity within a firm (see appendix).
Thus, for any given set of assets, the amount of equity the
firm has does not alter the amount of risk inherent in the
assets, it merely determines the proportion of the risk that
is assumed by its individual equity holders. Consequently,
for any given level of equity, shareholder value can always
be enhanced either by increasing the ex post rate of return
for the given level of risk, or more importantly for a bank,
which has little scope for significantly enhancing the earn-
ings on its loan portfolio, by reducing the variance of those
earnings through improved portfolio management. 
Second, if the purpose of the process is to maximise
the firm’s Sharpe Ratio by encouraging risk-optimising
behaviour, it has to capture all the important components
of a firm’s earnings volatility. The Sharpe Ratio that is rele-
vant to the investor is simply the excess return on the
firm’s equity relative to the volatility of that return. 
In ex post terms, this can be expressed as: 
                         ,
where
 is the observed firmwide return on the investment 
in time t, 
 is the return on the risk-free rate at time t, and
 is the standard deviation of   measured at time t.
Management’s objective at time t is therefore to
maximise the expected Sharpe Ratio over the future
period  t+1.  In order to do this, management has to be able
to predict   and  . This means that we need to
be able to understand both the components of 
and the determinants of its variance,  . 
In a simple model of the firm, we can express
 as follows:
                   ,
where
 is the forecast value of earnings in time t+1,
 is the change in the value of the firm’s portfolio of
assets in time t+1,  
 is the value of the firm’s new business revenues in
time t+1, and
 is the costs that the firm incurs in time t+1.
We can express   as  , so that by
definition: 
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Because this is a forward-looking process, the firm
cannot rely solely on observed historical values. It needs to
be able to estimate their likely values in the future. The
firm must therefore understand the dynamics of each of
,  , and  , and in particular the elements
that contribute significantly to both their variance and
covariance. These are the risk drivers of the business, which
need to be identified and modeled if the firm is to have an
effective shadow pricing process for its risk. 
As a result of this approach, it is possible to think
in terms of a generic risk pricing  approach for maximising
shareholder value, using generally agreed-upon risk pricing
tools that could be applicable to all financial firms. Just
as value at risk measures for market risk have become a
common currency for comparing and analysing market
risk between firms, a similar approach to other risk factors
could readily be developed out of this model. 
IV. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE FOR THE FIRM 
As we have explained, there is no causal link between the
level of gearing that a firm chooses and its Sharpe Ratio.
However, this is subject to one important caveat, which
is that the amount of equity capital that a firm holds has
to be large enough to enable it to survive the “normal”
variability of its earnings. This means that at the mini-
mum, a firm will need to have some multiple of its
expected earnings volatility— k, where k is a fixed
multiplier—as equity capital. Failure to maintain such an
amount should lead to a risk premium on the firm’s equity,
which would make the cost of capital prohibitive. In most
cases, though, management will choose to operate in some
excess of this minimum level. 
The question we therefore need to address here is
how much equity capital in excess of  k will a
well-managed firm choose to hold, and how should it
reach that decision?
Although by definition the amount of equity that
the firm chooses will itself be a multiple of  k,2
the methodology for deciding how to set that amount
needs to be significantly different from the methodology
by which the shadow pricing amount   is determined.
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This is so for three reasons. First, financial markets are
prone to the characteristics of fat tails, which means that it
is dangerous to rely solely on the properties of statistical
distributions to predict either the frequency or the size of
extreme events. Given that one of the responsibilities of the
management of a financial firm is to ensure the continuity
of that firm in the long term—which will in turn help to
ensure that the perceived risk of bankruptcy is kept to a
minimum—the firm needs to be able to analyse the nature
of these rare events and ensure that the capital and balance-
sheet structure are robust enough to withstand these occur-
rences and still be able to continue in business thereafter. 
Thus, while in the case of certain risk factors the
potential stress or extreme loss that the firm faces and
needs to protect against may indeed be best estimated by
an extension of the statistical measures used to calculate
, in other cases the results of scenario analysis may
yield numbers well in excess of the statistical measure.
(The 1987 market crash, for example, was a 27 standard
deviation event—well outside the scope of any value-at-risk
measure.) As a result, statistical techniques that are appli-
cable to a risk pricing process need to be supplemented
with effective scenario and stress analysis techniques in
order for management to assess the potential scale of the
firm’s exposure to such extreme events.
The second consideration in managing the firm’s
capital is how to optimise the firm’s equity structure in an
imperfect world. In theory, in the absence of any significant
risk of bankruptcy, the market should be indifferent between
different levels of leverage for firms with the same Sharpe
Ratio, but it is not clear that this is the case. In particu-
lar, highly capitalised banks, which should have lower target
returns on equity to compensate for their lower risk premia,
appear to remain under pressure to provide similar returns
on equity to more thinly capitalised firms. 
Third, management has the additional require-
ment to ensure that it complies with regulatory capital
requirements, set by reference to regulatory measures of
risk, which often do not correspond with internal risk mea-
sures and in many cases conflict with them.
This means that one of the principal strategic con-
siderations for management is to optimise the capital
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structure, bearing in mind the three different consider-
ations of protecting the firm against catastrophic loss,
meeting shareholder expectations, and complying with
external regulatory requirements. 
The essential requirement for this optimisation
exercise is to ensure that the two following conditions are
always met:
                   , (Condition 1)
where 
 is the minimum level of capitalisation at which
firm i can raise capital funds in the market for its given
level of risk, and   is the amount of capital
that the firm actually holds 
and
    , (Condition 2)
where
 is the amount of capital that firm i is
required to hold under the existing regulatory capital
regime.
This formulation shows clearly why in a shadow
pricing approach to risk, based on the calculation of  ,
the amount of capital at risk and therefore being charged to
the business is always likely to be less than the total capital
of the firm.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the firm, the
preferable relationship between these three considerations
would also be such that
   ,
(Condition 3)
where 
 is the amount of capital that the firm
would choose for itself in the absence of a regulatory
constraint.
Where this condition can be met, the firm can
concentrate solely on optimising its capital structure and
maximising shareholder value without having to factor
considerations about the impact of a regulatory capital
regime into its optimisation exercise. 
For completeness, we can also note here that the
further necessary condition should exist from the regula-
tory perspective for any regulatory capital regime to be
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appropriately represented as risk-based, which is 
             , (Condition 4)
so that the risk-based regulatory capital requirement is at
least consistent with the market’s assessment of the mini-
mum amount of capital a firm should have in order to
protect against the risk inherent in its business. This, in
turn, by combining Conditions 2 and 4, leads us to the
minimum requirement for a satisfactory regulatory capital
regime that 
       .
(Condition 5)
We return to this issue, and in particular the
relationship between the regulatory requirements and
optimal capital structure for the firm in more detail in
Section VI.
V. RISK MEASUREMENT—THE CHALLENGE 
OF NORMALISATION
Now that we have distinguished between the different
purposes of risk measurement for shadow pricing of risk
and for the determination of the optimal capital structure,
we can move on to consider the challenges of building an
effective risk measurement system. The objective here is to
enable management to assess the different risks that a firm
faces in a broadly similar fashion, and to understand their
interrelationships. This requires both a common measure-
ment framework and a methodology for ensuring that the
risk process covers all the material risks that may impact
the shadow pricing process or the decisions about the
capital structure.
At the outset, a firm has to have a clear under-
standing of the meaning of risk if it is to develop an
effective risk measurement methodology. For the purposes
of this paper, we can define the risk in a firm on an ex post
basis as the observed volatility of the firm’s earnings over
time around a mean value. The firm’s risk measures are
thus the firm’s best estimates of that volatility, which man-
agement can then use to make choices between different
business strategies and investment decisions and to deter-
mine the firm’s capital structure. 
st 1 + () ki RegulatoryiCapitali £
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In order to achieve this, it is necessary to distin-
guish between the three measures of expected, unexpected,
and stress loss as follows.
The expected loss associated with a risk factor is simply
the expected value of the firm’s exposure to that risk factor.
It is important to recognise that expected loss is not itself a
risk measure but is rather the best estimate of the economic
cost of the firm’s exposure to a risk. The clearest example of
this at present is the treatment of credit risk, where banks
know that over the credit cycle they will incur losses with a
high probability, but only account for those losses as they
occur. This introduces a measure of excessive volatility into
the firm’s reported earnings, which is not a true measure of
the “risk,” given that the defaults are predictable with a high
degree of confidence. The true risk is only that part of the
loss that diverges from the expected value.
Having established the expected loss associated
with a risk, it is then possible to measure the variance of
that cost in order to establish the extent to which it con-
tributes to the overall variance of the firm’s earnings, which
we term the unexpected loss associated with the risk factor.
Both VaR for market risk and the credit risk measures pro-
duced by CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+ are examples of
measures of unexpected loss that can be used in an internal
risk pricing process of the type discussed in Section III.
However, comparison of these two approaches also points
up the significance of adopting different time horizons in
measuring different risks. 
VaR measures for market risk are typically either
a one-day or ten-day measure of risk. By contrast, the
modeling of default risk, which is still at an early stage of
development, typically utilises an annual observation
period, since default frequencies change over a much longer
time horizon than market prices. As a result of these dif-
ferent time horizons, a ten-day 99 percent confidence
interval for market risk would imply that the VaR limit
could be expected to be exceeded once every three years. An
annually based VaR of 97.5 percent for credit risk, how-
ever, would be expected to be exceeded only once every
forty years. Aggregating the two measures into a single
measure of the firm’s risk—even assuming for the moment
that the firm’s market and credit risk were independent—
would not provide a satisfactory indication of the aggregate
risk that the firm faces. 
A further problem with the estimation of unex-
pected losses is the availability of reliable data for the
different risk factors that a firm faces. Significant progress
has been made on measuring market risk because of the
availability of daily data for prices and for revenues within
firms, and more recently progress has also been made on
modeling credit risk, although here the data quality
problem is proving more challenging. In the case of other
risk factors such as liquidity, legal, and operational risks,
however, the analysis is likely to have to rely on firms’ own
internal data, and very little work has yet been undertaken
to examine the statistical properties of those risks. More-
over, meaningful estimates of the covariances between risk
factors will only be possible once reliable estimates can be
made of unexpected loss on a stand-alone basis.
In addition to the need to develop expected and
unexpected loss measures, which are particularly relevant
to the firm’s risk pricing methodology, the firm also has
to have a methodology for determining the extreme or
stress loss that it might face over the longer term horizon as
a result of its exposure to a risk factor in order to make
meaningful decisions about its capital structure and risk
limits systems. A number of risk measures and limits, such
as the concentration limits that banking regulators use to
limit the proportion of a bank’s capital that can be at risk
to any one counterparty, are derived explicitly or implicitly
from this type of measure. The methodology that a firm
may choose for calculating the potential stress loss associ-
ated with a particular risk will vary from risk factor to risk
factor, but will typically consist of a form of scenario simu-
lation, which envisions the type of situation where the firm
could potentially be put at risk from a particular risk
factor, or a combination of factors, and then assesses the
firm’s capital resources and limits structures by reference to
the results of this exercise.
Given that the purpose of measuring risk is to
estimate the exposure of the firm to earnings variability
from its principal risk drivers, the firm also needs to
have a factor model that identifies the key risk factors to
which it is exposed and measures their impact on the176 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
volatility of the earnings stream. The issue we now need
to address is, What are these risk drivers and how can
they be measured effectively?
In order to establish a starting point for this
exercise, we can use the 1994 Basle Committee paper on
risk management for derivatives, which identified six risks
that firms face—market risk, credit risk, settlement risk,
liquidity risk, legal risk, and operational risk. If we relate
this list back to the shadow pricing equation in Section III,
we can readily see how much still remains to be done in
establishing an effective internal risk pricing process. 
As we discussed in Section III, firms have started
this process by analysing their trading exposure to
market risk, which is where the data are most readily
available. It is interesting to note, however, that even in
the context of market risk, few firms are yet able to
measure their overall revenue exposure from areas such as
corporate finance or funds management to movements in
market variables, even though these may be significantly
more powerful factors in determining the quality of their
earnings in the medium term, not least because the time
horizons are different.
In a manner similar to their work on market risk,
firms have turned their attention more recently to the
issues associated with the measurement of the unexpected
loss associated with credit risk. Work in this area derives
from two parallel initiatives. On the one hand, there has
been increasing interest, stimulated in considerable part by
the Basle Committee’s model-based approach to capital
requirements for market risk, in developing models of the
specific risk in the trading book. On the other hand, there
has been an increasing effort to develop reliable models for
measuring the default risk in the banking book. 
The third category of risk identified in the 1994
paper in the context of derivative products was settlement
risk. In practice, settlement risk is a special case of credit
risk, since it arises from the failure of a counterparty to
perform on a contract. Its particular characteristic is that it
arises on a daily basis as transactions—particularly in
foreign exchange and payments business—are settled, and
the magnitude of the daily exposure between different
financial institutions in relation to settlement risk is many
times larger than for other risk factors. The primary chal-
lenge for a financial firm is therefore to be able to capture
and monitor its settlement risk in a timely manner. Once
this has been done, the same methodology for measuring
expected and unexpected loss can be applied to settlement
risk as for other types of credit risk.    
To date, the techniques for measuring liquidity risk
have tended to focus on the potential stress loss associated
with the risk, whether in the form of the cash capital mea-
sure used by the U.S. securities firms or the funding gap
analysis undertaken by bank treasuries. Both are attempts
to quantify what might occur in extreme cases if the firm’s
funding sources dried up. While this is clearly a prudent
and desirable part of corporate financial management, it
should also be possible to apply the framework of expected
and unexpected loss to liquidity risk by measuring the
extent to which the liquidity risk inherent in the business
gives rise to costs in hedging out that risk through the
corporate treasury function. 
In a similar way to the approach to liquidity risk,
the focus to date in analysing the impact of legal risk and
other aspects of operational risk has been in seeking to
prevent the serious problems that have given rise to the
well-publicised losses, such as those of Hammersmith
and Fulham in the context of legal risk, or those of Barings
and Daiwa Bank in the context of operational risk more
generally. As with liquidity risk, however, the issue that
has yet to be addressed in the context of internal risk
pricing is how these risk factors contribute to the earn-
ings volatility of the firm, since operational risk can be
seen as a general term that applies to all the risk factors
that influence the volatility of the firm’s cost structure as
opposed to its revenue structure. It is therefore necessary
for the firm to classify and analyse more precisely the
nature of these risk factors before any meaningful attempt
can be made to fit them into a firmwide risk model of the
type envisaged by this paper.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, a considerable
amount of further work clearly still remains to be under-
taken in the development of risk modeling in financial
firms. Nevertheless, despite the evident gaps in the devel-
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proceeding to implement a risk pricing methodology for
those risks that can be measured. This is because with risk
pricing there is no presumption that the risk measures should
add to the total capital of the firm, and thus there is no
danger of misallocating capital to the wrong business, which
can occur if a risk-based capital allocation model is used with
an incomplete risk model. Given this fact, the integrity of
the risk measure for the particular risk factor is the primary
consideration, and the need for a strict normalisation of risk
measures—so that the measures for each risk factor can be
aggregated on a consistent “apples for apples” basis—
assumes a lesser importance as an immediate objective. 
VI. RISK ALLOCATION METHODOLOGIES 
AND REGULATORY CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS—A SYNTHESIS?
Having outlined the components of an integrated approach
to risk pricing and capital optimisation within financial
firms, we can now consider the implications of this analysis
for the structure of a satisfactory regulatory capital frame-
work. In this context, we do not seek to analyse the differ-
ent rationales for capital regulation, but simply note that it
is now widely accepted that any regulatory capital require-
ment should be risk-based and should be consistent with
firms’ own internal risk measurement methodologies, so
that a firm that carries more risk is subject to a higher cap-
ital requirement than one that carries less risk.
As we have explained, the core objective of a
firm’s own internal risk pricing mechanism should be to
enhance shareholder value by encouraging behaviour that
will improve the firm’s overall Sharpe Ratio. In normal
circumstances, this will be separate from the process of
determining the optimal capital structure for the firm.
The difference between the two is that the risk pricing
exercise is based on a measure of unexpected loss and is
designed to operate at the margin, at the level of the indi-
vidual business decision. The decision on the capital
structure should, by contrast, be based on an assessment
of stress loss scenarios and be independent of activity at
the margin, leading to the minimum capital condition
that, identified in Section III, that
                  .  (Condition 1) st 1 + () ki TotaliCapitali £
In Section III, we also derived the following mini-
mum condition, which we believe should be satisfied in order
to characterise a regulatory capital regime as adequately risk-
based
        ,
 (Condition  5)
and we identified the desirable condition for a well-managed 
and well-capitalised firm that
    .
(Condition 3)
We can now assess how these requirements compare under
three alternative approaches to setting regulatory capital
requirements, which can be summarised as follows:
• the fixed ratio approach (Basle 1988/CAD/SEC 
net capital rule)
• the internal measures approach (Basle market risk
1997/Derivatives Policy Group proposals)
• the precommitment approach.
The fixed ratio approach calculates the required
regulatory capital for a financial firm by reference to a reg-
ulatory model of the “riskiness” of the firm’s balance sheet.
The problem associated with any regime of this sort, which
seeks to impose an arbitrary measure of the riskiness of a
firm’s business on a transaction-by-transaction basis, is that
there is no mechanism for testing it against the true risk in
the firm, which will by definition vary from firm to firm.
As a result, the only part of Conditions 3 and 5 that this
approach  can satisfy a priori is that 
,
which is achieved by regulatory requirement. But Condition 1
is violated because we cannot be sure that
and equally, there is no way of ensuring for a well-managed
firm that Condition 3 can be met because there is no mech-
anism for ensuring that 
.
Given these flaws, it is difficult to see how a fixed ratio
regime could realistically be adapted to meet our condi-
tions for an optimal capital structure. 
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By comparison with the fixed ratio approach, the
internal models approach is clearly preferable from the view-
point of the well-managed firm, since it seeks to equate
regulatory capital to 
,
where m is the regulatory multiplier. 
If we assume that m is set at a level that is higher
than k (the minimum capital requirement for a viable firm)
but at a level that is still economic, it is likely that the
well-managed firm will be able to live with this regime,
provided it has a sufficient margin of capital between
 and  . 
However, it is questionable whether such a “full
models” regime is genuinely optimal, or could be intro-
duced quickly, since neither the industry nor the regulators
are yet able to define the model that determines   for
the whole firm. Consequently, a decision to use a full
models approach for regulatory capital purposes would
commit both regulators and financial firms to a significant
investment of resources, with an indeterminate end date,
and would at the same time provide no assurance that the
outcome was superior to a simpler and less resource-
intensive approach.
The precommitment approach, by contrast with either
the fixed ratio or internal models approach, has the attrac-
tion of simplicity and synergy with the firm’s own pro-
cesses since it allows firms to determine their own capital
requirement for the risks they face. If the regulators are
able to ascertain that the firm’s internal procedures are such
as to ensure that 
with sufficient margin to satisfy the regulatory needs for
capital, then precommitment in its most complete sense
has the simple result that 
 ,
which satisfies the requirements of our three conditions.
However it is questionable whether a full pre-
commitment approach, as outlined, can be defined as a
regulatory capital regime at all. It would probably be
better described as an internal controls regime, since in
substance it would mean that the regulator would review
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the methodology whereby the firm undertook its risk pric-
ing and capital structuring decisions and would either
approve them—allowing precommitment—or impose a
capital requirement if they were not satisfied with the
process. In addition, the regulatory authority would be
susceptible to criticism, in the event that a problem was
encountered at a firm that had been allowed to employ the
precommitment approach, that it had unnecessarily fore-
gone an important regulatory technique.
Given the evident problems of a move that is as
radical as the precommitment proposal, we therefore
believe that it is worthwhile to consider a fourth approach,
which we refer to as the base plus approach. Under this
approach, the regulator would determine directly on a
firm-by-firm basis the regulatory capital requirement for
the forthcoming period as an absolute amount, say  ,
based on some relatively simple rules such as a multiple
of the firm’s costs or revenues in the previous year, and
modified to take account of the risk profile of the firm. The
basis for setting this requirement should be clearly defined,
and would need to be sufficient to ensure that the condi-
tion for the well-managed firm was met such that 
.
However, in order to prevent the firm from
exploiting this fixed capital requirement by changing its
risk profile after the capital requirement was set, the firm
would also be required to supplement its regulatory capital
by a precommitment amount that should be sufficient to
cover the amount that its risk profile changed during the
reference period.
The advantage of this approach would be that it
would be simple from the firm’s perspective, it would
require relatively little detailed assessment by the regulator
of the firm’s own internal models regime, and would not be
conditional on the firm having modeled every material risk
before it took effect. At the same time, it could have incen-
tives built in, since the more confident the regulator was
about the quality of the firm’s internal controls the lower
could   be set, while still leaving the regulator the
ultimate authority to ensure that all firms were capitalised
at a level sufficiently in excess of   to protect the
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overall system against the risk of extreme systemic events.
From the perspective of the firms, the fact that additional
capital was required at the level of changes in   and
not based on a higher multiplier would ensure that the
regulatory regime remained in line with the requirements
of the internal risk pricing, so avoiding the risk of regula-
tory arbitrage arising from inappropriate capital rules. 
VII. CONCLUSION
It is becoming increasingly clear that the regulatory capital
requirements for both banks and securities firms are not
appropriately aligned either with the risk that those firms
are taking or with the way in which those firms manage
their own risks in order to  maximise shareholder value and
optimise their capital structures. In this paper, we have
argued that this process has two elements. Internal risk
measures such as value at risk can be used by financial firms
as a means of enhancing shareholder value by targeting
st 1 + () k
directly the firmwide Sharpe Ratio rather than through the
indirect mechanism of internal capital allocation. However,
we argue that these measures of unexpected loss need to be
supplemented by techniques such as scenario analysis when
assessing the firm’s potential exposure to stress loss and
thus determining the firm’s optimal capital structure. 
In light of these considerations, we do not believe
that any of the current proposed regulatory capital regimes,
which we characterise as the regulatory ratio approach,
internal models approach, and the precommitment
approach, are consistent with this account of risk pricing
and capital optimisation within firms. By contrast, we
believe that our proposal for a base plus approach to regula-
tory capital would be consistent with both regulatory
objectives and firms’ own internal processes, and as such
would provide a sound basis for a regulatory capital regime
for financial firms in the twenty-first century.180 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 APPENDIX
1. Definitions:
Arbitrary Amount of Investment
Financing Amount of Investment 
Capital Allocated to Investment 
Such that:
        .
(This is merely a restatement of an accounting fact
that assets = liabilities.)
Further:
Expected Profits from Investment I net of
direct and allocated indirect costs before funding
Expected Net Profits, that is, profits after
funding costs
Expected Return (percent) on (arbitrary
amount) Capital Allocated to Investment I,
where:
        .
Volatility of Profits
Volatility of Return on Equity
the Default Free Interest Rate
In its simplest form, the Sharpe Ratio is defined as
the excess return of an investment over the standard
deviation of the excess return. If we assume that inter-
est rates are fixed over the time horizon of the invest-
ment, then the volatilities of returns and of excess
returns are the same.
2. First Result:
Many activities in banking effectively require little or
no investment at the outset (if regulatory capital
requirements are neglected for a moment), such as
swaps and futures. For this reason, we choose to start
with an absolute revenue-based Sharpe Ratio and
extend it to a relative (percent) measure in a second
step.
The excess profits over the risk-free rate of interest
for capital and after any refinancing costs are given by:















Exp P () rf F – rf C –
and the Sharpe Ratio therefore by
 
       
        .
The Sharpe Ratio of the Expected Revenues is thus
given by the profits net of the costs for full (that is,
100 percent) refinancing over the volatility of earnings.
3. Second Result:
If return is measured as the ratio of absolute return to
allocated capital (which can be an arbitrary amount),
then the following result holds for volatilities:
        .
This simple result obviously guarantees that the
Sharpe Ratio does not change its value since both the
numerator and the denominator are scaled by the same
amount. A closer examination of the above formula,
however, gives some intuition for this result
.
Apart from the fact that the C cancels out, one can see
that the higher the leverage the higher the expected
return on the one hand, but the higher also the volatility
of the returns, which leaves the Sharpe Ratio
unchanged.
4. Conclusion:
As long as the institution can refinance itself at
approximately the risk-free rate, or its refinancing rate
is indifferent to changes in volatility over the relevant
range, the amount of capital that it allocates to the
business will not affect its Sharpe Ratio. This can be
seen by solving the Sharpe Ratio backwards for some
Exp P () rf F – rf C –
VolP
--------------------------------------------
Exp P () rf FC + () –
VolP
--------------------------------------------- =
Exp P () rf I –
VolP
----------------------------- =
Exp Pnet () rf C –
VolP
------------------------------------ =
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(arbitrary) capital allocation C:
         .
































--- Vol P ()
------------------------------- =
Exp P () rf I –
Vol P ()
----------------------------- =
Of course, this whole relationship changes as soon
as the marginal cost of funding becomes a function of
the credit quality of the institution. In that case, the
costs of funding become an increasing function of the
volatility of the profits (or returns) and, as a conse-
quence, the Sharpe Ratio drops.
It is for this reason that the absolute level of capi-
tal in banks is held at some multiple of the volatility of
the earnings, since this ensures that the cost of funding
at the margin remains independent of day-to-day
changes in the risk profile of the firm.182 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
The authors are grateful to Marcel Rohner of Swiss Bank Corporation for his
contribution to the development of this paper and for providing the appendix.
1. This is borne out by the experience of the recent precommitment
pilot study and by the value at risk returns provided by members of the
Derivatives Policy Group in the United States to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
2. Strictly, we should denote our risk term as  —that is,
expected value at time t of the standard deviation of earnings at time
. For ease of notation, however, we adopt the term   for the rest
of this paper.
E st 1 + () t
t 1 + st 1 +
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